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微观理论workshop: Discrimination through Market Segmentation

发布日期：2023-05-18 12:00    来源：

时间：5月18日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：经院302

主讲人：孟德隆（上海交通大学助理教授）

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠（国发院）；翁翕（光华

题目: Discrimination through Market Segmentation

摘要：We study third-degree information discrimination where a sender gives different information to different segments of receivers. Information discrimination (with two actions) is equivalent to (constrained) price discrimination where the seller has an inaccurate belief about the distribution of buyers' values. When the state is binary, the seller's inaccurate belief implies that market segmentation fails to restore efficiency. For general state distribution we identify when market segmentation attains the social planner's outcome. Finally the receiver-optimal segmentation could increase the sender's payoff relative to the unsegmented market.

主讲人介绍：Delong Meng is an assistant professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.  His research interests include micro theory and behavioral economics.

 


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